To Win Over Hong Kong And Taiwan, Xi Jinping Must Break A 2,000-Year Tradition
China鈥檚聽鈥渙ne country, two systems鈥 formula
Under this policy, the former British colony of Hong Kong is promised a high degree of autonomy, an independent judiciary and freedoms unseen in mainland China.
in聽Hong Kong聽is failing miserably.
After more than six months of聽large-scale pro-democracy protests聽鈥 including violent clashes with police 鈥 the city鈥檚 voters dealt a聽powerful blow in November to pro-mainland parties, which lost 87% of seats to pro-democracy rivals in district council elections.
The significance of that election should not be underestimated. While district councils have little power, they select some of the 1,200 electors who choose聽Hong Kong鈥檚 chief executive. In the next election, pro-democracy parties will fill nearly 10% of those seats.
The election also had important symbolic implications.
District councils are elected in a fully democratic process (compared to only half the seats in the聽Legislative Council). With an impressive 71% turnout, the election was widely seen as a聽vote of no confidence聽in Beijing-backed Chief Executive Carrie Lam.
Some people have lost faith in the prospect of maintaining democracy within one country, two systems. This is reflected in growing demands for independence.
While independence remains聽a fringe idea聽鈥 owing partly to recognition of China鈥檚聽uncompromising stand on territorial integrity聽鈥 almost no one under the age of 30 in Hong Kong聽identifies exclusively as Chinese.
A聽similar backlash聽is also occurring in聽Taiwan. Having enjoyed de facto independence since 1949, Taiwan was supposed to be drawn back into the Chinese fold by one country, two systems.
But that model鈥檚 failure in Hong Kong has聽hardened anti-China sentiment, and turned voters away from the political parties which favor closer ties with the mainland.
This represents a shift from last year鈥檚 midterm elections, when the Kuomintang secured key victories over the ruling, pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
In fact, that outcome was probably less about desiring closer ties with Beijing than about delivering a sharp rebuke to the DPP.
Indeed, after President Xi Jinping, in his 2019 New Year鈥檚 speech, urged Taiwan to follow in Hong Kong鈥檚 footsteps, President Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP revived her popularity by reasserting Taiwan鈥檚 sovereignty.
Bolstered by the Hong Kong crisis, Tsai now seems to be coasting toward聽a landslide victory in January鈥檚 presidential election.
Far from enabling China鈥檚 peaceful reunification, the one country, two systems model is undermining it.
Perhaps this was inevitable, owing to a cause more fundamental than Xi鈥檚聽centralization of power, the Communist Party鈥 increasing interference in Hong Kong鈥檚 affairs, or even the basic contradiction between a one-party regime and a multiparty democracy.
The Chinese state, built on a centuries-old paradigm of political order, cannot cope with intergovernmental conflict.
Modern democracy is based on division, within society and the state. In society, different groups compete for representation.
In the state, there is a horizontal separation of powers (among the legislative, executive and judicial branches) and a vertical division of powers (among national and subnational governments).
For countries with a history of foreign domination, such divisions may seem like weaknesses that can be exploited by outsiders using a divide-and-rule strategy.
China does maintain a separation of powers. But it is much more comfortable with horizontal, than vertical, checks and balances. For more than 2,000 years, imperial courts appointed a censor-in-chief to manage ministers and grandmasters of remonstrance to criticize emperors.
Conflicts between national and subnational governments, however, were historically divided into three categories 鈥 warlordism, insubordination and foreign threat. To this day, China鈥檚 rulers distrust leaders with a local base, often choosing outsiders as provincial governors and party bosses.
From the Chinese government鈥檚 perspective, 鈥淗ong Kong ruled by Hongkongers鈥 was already a risky concession. So it ruled out a directly elected chief executive and worked to suppress the opposition.
This backfired. China鈥檚 interference undermined the ability of older 鈥渄emocrats鈥 who identified as Chinese to deliver the changes the people demanded, so they were replaced by younger 鈥渓ocalists鈥. When China attempted to suppress these figures, resistance intensified.
By early this year, when Lam introduced a bill that would make it easier to聽extradite criminal suspects to China, the people of Hong Kong were聽fed up. Many聽young protesters聽believe they have so little to lose that they effectively seek destruction.
China now faces a dilemma. Unless democracy is shown to support the dream of civilizational resurgence, it will lack legitimacy among Chinese nationalists.
But the only way to revive one country, two systems is to accept intergovernmental conflict 鈥 a great leap toward聽embracing democracy.
Institutionalized respect for regional identity and autonomy has eased separatist sentiment in Tamil Nadu, Scotland and Quebec, and it could do the same in Hong Kong, possibly even Taiwan.
But if China continues to suppress intergovernmental conflict, the collapse of the one country, two systems model will be only a matter of time.
This article first appeared in Inkstone on 23 December 2019.
